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I. INTRODUCTIONNarly ten years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991,' litigants, jurors and the public are quite familiar with
Nthe term "punitive damages." Plaintiffs want them, defendants
'Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)). 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) enables
complaining parties to recover compensatory and punitive damages for Title VII
unlawful intentional discrimination, provided that they cannot recover
compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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fear them, juries award them,2 and the public is often fascinated by them.
Despite numerous court decisions that demonstrate the availability of
punitive damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 ("Title
VII' or "the Act") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a,4 the courts disagree as to the
circumstances in which a plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages. One
issue that currently divides courts is whether a jury can award punitive
damages to a Title VII plaintiff after it concludes that the plaintiff is not
entitled to any compensatory damages under § 198 1a. The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has answered this question in the
negative, while the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and several
federal district courts have held that ajury is permitted to award a Title VII
plaintiffpunitive damages under § 198la without awarding compensatory
damages under § 198 Ia.'
Suppose that an employee sues her former employer for sex
discrimination under Title VII. Also suppose that immediately after the
plaintiff perceives the discrimination she leaves her job and immediately
accepts a new job that offers her a salary equal to her prior salary. The
2 In July 2000, for example, a Florida jury "ordered the tobacco industry... to
pay $144.8 billion in punitive damages to some 500,000 Florida smokers." Rick
Brag, Tobacco Lawsuit in Florida Yields Record Damages, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15,
2000, at Al. This ruling, "the largest damage award in United States history,"
surpassedthe$5 billion punitive damage award against Exxon Mobil for the Exxon
Valdez oil spill and the $4.8 billion award against General Motors as a result ofa
car fire in California. Id. For examples of juries awarding punitive damages in the
employment context, see Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978, 984-85 (4th
Cir. 1997) (upholding ajury's punitive damage award of $150,000 to each of the
two plaintiffs); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 912 F. Supp. 663 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aftd,
110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997) (reducing a jury's punitive damage award of
$5,000,002 to $300,000 pursuant to the statutory limit of 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(3)(D)). See generally ERIK MOLLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, PuNrrivE DAMAGES IN FINANCIAL INJURY VERDICTS: AN ExEcUrIvE
SUMMARY (1997) (finding that in cases awarding punitive damages in the analyzed
jurisdictions the average award was approximately $5,300,000 and that for
employment cases the average was approximately $2,700,000), http://www.rand.
org/publications/MR/MR889/MR889.text.html#dispute.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -2000e-17 (1994).
4 Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). Section 1981a
greatly altered the landscape of employment discrimination law by permitting
additional remedies such as compensatory and punitive damages to deter
discrimination and to protect victims of intentional discrimination. See infra Part
III.
5See infra Part llI.B.
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plaintiff, nonetheless, brings a claim under Title VII to punish the
defendant company and prevent it from discriminating in the future. The
jury finds the defendant liable for sex discrimination, but also finds that the
plaintiff did not suffer any economic loss or compensable injury as a result
of the discrimination. Also assume that the plaintiff did not request an
instruction on nominal damages and, therefore, the jury neither considers
nor awards nominal damages. After finding liability, however, the jury
further determines that the defendant acted with malice or reckless
indifference to the plaintiff's rights, thereby subjecting the defendant to
punitive damages under § 1981 a.6 Should the jury be able to award punitive
damages even though it did not award compensatory or nominal damages?
What if, however, the plaintiff is awarded back pay, but is not awarded
any compensatory damages pursuant to § 198la(a)(1), the statutory
authority that allows the jury to award compensatory and punitive damages
for Title VII claims. Should a back pay award permit the jury to award a
plaintiff punitive damages under § 198la? What if the plaintiff brings
discrimination claims pursuant to state and federal law and the jury decides
to apportion all compensatory damages according to the plaintiff's state
law claims and awards nothing under federal law. Should the jury then be
prevented from awarding any punitive damages under federal law?
This Article seeks to answer these questions and advocates a rule that
will act to fuirtherunify the federal civil rights laws, ensure more consistent
and coherent punitive damage jurisprudence under Title VII, and protect
both Title VII plaintiffs and defendants. Part H provides a background of
the history and purpose of punitive damages.7 Part III focuses on early
federal civil rights legislation, upon which courts frequently rely for Title
VII jurisprudence.8 More specifically, Part III provides background to
claims under § 1981 and § 1983 and discusses the circumstances under
which punitive damages may be awarded pursuant to those statutes. Part IV
expands this discussion to include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the 1991 amendments to Title VII, which include § 198 la.9 Thereafter,
6 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(b)(1) (1994). In 1999, the Supreme Court clarified that an
employer's conduct does not have to be egregious to satisfy the requirement for
punitive damages under § 198 1a. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,534-
35 (1999). Rather, punitive damages may be awarded when a jury finds that an
employer acted "in the face ofa perceived risk that its actions" would violate Title
VII. Id. at 536. This standard also applies to punitive damage claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and42 U.S.C. § 1983. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 14-45 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 46-97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 98-124 and accompanying text.
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Part IV analyzes the cases that have addressed whether a jury can award
punitive damages under § 1981a without first awarding compensatory
damages under that statute. 10
Part V argues that neither a nominal award nor a compensatory award
of any type should be required to accompany a punitive damage award
under § 1981 a.1" Specifically, theplain language of§ 198 la and Congress's
intent to further unify the federal civil rights statutes support this
conclusion. Moreover, a victim ofan employer's malicious behavior should
be entitled to all available damages even when ajury chooses not to award
compensatory damages. Allowing the jury's allocation and apportionment
of damages to determine whether such victim is entitled to receive punitive
damages will cause inconsistent and impractical results--contrary to
Congress's intent when it enacted § 1981a. In fact, juries may not
understand the task of allocating and apportioning damages, thereby further
demonstrating that it is unwise to rely on such allocations as the basis for
awarding damages under § 1981a.12 Part VI argues that protections
currently exist to ensure that Title VII defendants will not face increased
maximum liability under a framework that allows punitive damages
without nominal or compensatory damages. 3 This section demonstrates
that Title VII defendants enjoy greater protections than defendants under
other federal civil rights statutes, who already face the possibility of
punitive awards even absent accompanying compensatory awards. As a
result, a rule that allows punitive damages without accompanying
compensatory damages does not place an unreasonable burden on Title VII
defendants.
H. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Historical Perspective ofPunitive Damages
"To... understand the... [purpose] and application of... punitive
damages... [in] today's jurisprudence, consideration should be given to
the [common law] origin of the doctrine." 4 In many respects, this origin
dates back to early English times, when King George II was displeased
10 See infra notes 126-216 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 220-74 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 254-74 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 275-331 and accompanying text.
14 I JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 1:01, at 1-2 (2d ed. 2000).
2000-2001]
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with some material published in North Briton, No. 45.15 As a result, the
Secretary of State to the king issued awarrant to punish and seize members
of the paper's staff.6 The warrant, which was general, did not name a
specific person.17 As a result, John Wilkes, who was believed to be the
paper's publisher, had his home searched pursuant to the warrant."8 In his
subsequent claim for trespass reported in Wilkes v. Wood, 9 Wilkes
requested "'large and exemplary damages,' "20 and argued that "trifling
damage[s] ... would not put a stop to the type of conduct of which he
complained."'
The theory of punitive damages emerged simultaneously in Hucide v.
Money,2 which can be considered a companion case to Wilkes v. Wood.
"Huckle was an employee of the person thought to be the printer of the
North Briton and was taken into custody and detained under the same
general warrant referred to in Wilkes." All throughout his six hour
confinement,24 however, the captor treated Huckle with "kindness and
courtesy."'2 Huckle brought an action for trespass and imprisonment and
the jury concluded that his damages amounted to three hundred pounds,
almost three hundred times Huckle's weekly earnings. 26 On appeal the
captor admitted liability, but alleged that the damages were "most
outrageous"27 in light of Huckle's lack of injury, brief confinement and
weekly income.28 In response, Lord Chief Justice Camden stated:
I think they have done right in giving exemplary damages. To enter a
man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure
evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no
Englishman would wish to live an hour; it was a most daring public attack





9 Wilkes v. Wood, 95 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B. 1763).
20 1 KIRCHER& WISEMAN, supra note 14, § 1:01, at 1-2.
211Id.
IHuckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
231 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 14, § 1:01, at 1-2.
1 Id. § 1:0 1, at 1-3 n.6.
25 Id. § 1:01, at 1-2.
26Id.
27 Id. § 1:0 1, at 1-3.
28Id.
29 Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 768-69 (KB. 1763).
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B. Purpose ofPunitive Damages: Supporters and Critics
While the early English cases illustrate that punitive damages were
sanctionedunder the law, disagreement ensued regarding the basis for them
and the purpose they were intended to serve." Most scholars, however,
emphasized that one purpose was to punish and deter the defendant.
Eventually, English law evolved to the point at which it was agreed that
punitive or exemplary damages were intended to punish and deter the
defendant,3' while compensatory damages were to compensate the plaintiff
for injury and economic loss.32 Early American cases demonstrated the
English confusion over the issue of whether punitive damages were meant
to deter and punish or to compensate.33 In Coryell v. Colbaugh,1 "the first
American case to enunciate the doctrine,""s punitive damages were
awarded for "example's sake"36 and for compensation as a result of the
defendant's breach of promise to marry the plaintiff.
37
In the 1850s, however, the deterrent function of punitive damages
became well established in American jurisprudence.3 8 In Day v. Wood-
worth,39 the Supreme Court stated that
30 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 14, § 1:02, at 1-4. Several theories were
advanced for allowing punitive damages. Id One theory proposed that punitive
damages were allowed because of courts' reluctance to grant new trials based on
excessive damages in cases that evidenced malice, oppression, gross fraud, or
negligence. See Early. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275,286 (1873), available at 1873 WL 994;
1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 14, § 1:02, at 1-4. Another theory suggested
that the doctrine developed as a result of courts' reluctance to recognize that
attaching an exact pecuniary value to certain injuries was difficult. See Stuartv. W.
Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351 (rex. 1885); 1 KIRCHER &WISEMAN, supra note 14,
§ 1:02, at 1-5. Under a third theory, the availability of punitive damages was "to
compensate the plaintiff for those damages which, at the time, were not legally
compensable."Id. Forother theories arguing thatpunitive damages were not meant
to punish or deter, see 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNTIVE
DAMAGES § 1.3(F)-(G) (4th ed. 2000).
31 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 14, § 1:03, at 1-8.
32 See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77,
at 278 (1935). The purpose of compensatory damages, to compensate for injury
and economic loss, is well established under American law. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1964).
33 1 SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 30, § 1.4(A), at 14.
31 Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791).
35 1 SCHLUETER &REDDEN, supra note 30, § 1.4(A), at 15.
36 Coryell, 1 N.L. at 77.
37 Id.
38 1 SCHLUETER &REDDEN, supra note 30, § 1.A(A), at 15-16.
39 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
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It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of
trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are
called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant,
having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of
compensation to the plaintiff.4
Nonetheless, awarding punitive damages as a civil remedy to punish and
deter has not operated without criticism in the United States.41 Those who'
support the concept of punitive damages claim that punishment serves an
important function in the civil law and more specifically, that "[e]xperience
indicates that there is definite need for the type of award having more the
quality of punishment than of compensation."42 Critics argue that the
purpose of civil law is to compensate and that if the action does not amount
to a crime, one should not suffer punishment.43 Despite such controversy,
American courts have accepted the notion of employing punitive damages
for the purpose of punishment and deterrence." The availability of
compensatory damages for pain, suffering, and economic loss has made the
award of punitive damages on such bases redundant. As a result, there is
considerable uniformity in the general aspects ofthe application ofpunitive
damages among the jurisdictions within the United States. While each state
is free to apply the doctrine independently when considering state law
claims, each jurisdiction must follow federal common law when applying
the doctrine of punitive damages under the federal civil rights statutes. 45
40 Id. at 371.
41 1 KIRCHER&WISEMAN, supra note 14, § 2:01, at2-2. In 1873, JusticeFoster
of the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that"[t]he idea [ofpunitive damages]
is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy ecresence,
deforming the symmetry of the body of the law." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382
(1873).
42 Philip H. Corboy, ShouldPunitive Damages BeAbolished?-A Statementfor
the Negative, 1965 A.B.A. SEC. INS.,NEGL. &COMPENSATIONL. PROC., 292,293.
43 See 1 KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 14, § 2.02, at 2-5.
"See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,350 (1974) (stating that
punitive damages "are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible
conduct and to deter its future occurrence"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that punitive
damages are awarded to punish defendants, teachinig them not to "do it again," and
to deter others from similar behavior).
41 In Basista v. Weir, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that state
law, under which punitive damages could not be awarded in the absence of actual
damages, was inapplicable in a case in which the plaintiff alleged deprivation of
civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85-87 (3d Cir.
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1II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER
THE EARLY FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
Sections 1981 and 1983 are parts of the Civil Rights Acts that were
enacted after the Civil War to "give force and effect to the newly ratified
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, andFifteenthAmendments. ' 6 Section 1981 provides
"a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis
of race,"'47 while § 1983 affords a remedy for discrimination where there is
"state action."'8 Because much of Title VII punitive damage jurisprudence
refers to and relies upon § 1981 and § 1983 decisions,49 it is appropriate to
discuss the punitive damage doctrine under these early federal civil rights
laws.
A. Section 1981
Section 198 l(a) provides, in material part, that "[a]ll persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right.., to make and
enforce contracts... as is enjoyedbywhite citizens." InJohnson v. Railway
Express Agency 5 the Court concluded that § 1981 provides a basis for an
independent federal cause ofaction forracial discrimination in employment'
1965). In doing so, the court reasoned that the Civil Rights Acts were intended to
have uniform effect throughout the country and that federal common law, rather
than state law, must apply to achieve such uniformity. Id. at 86. The court also
noted that the application of federal law on the issue of compensatory damages and
the application of state law on the issue of punitive damages would "create a legal
hybrid of an incredible and unworkable kind." Id. at 87.
46 See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 668 (2d ed. 1983).
47 Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,459-60 (1975).
48 SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 46, at 678.
49 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPENSATORY AND PUNI-
TiVE DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 102 OF THE CrVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, POLICY
STATEMENTNO. 915.002, EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 2062, at 2071 n.13 (July
14, 1992). The Commission's position statement stated that "[c]ases awarding
compensatory and punitive damages under other civil rights statutes will be used
for guidance in analyzing the availability of damages under § 198 la. Section 1981
cases are particularly useful because Congress treated the § 1981a damage
provisions as an amendment to § 1981." Id.
5 42 U.S.C. § 198 1(a) (1994).
st Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
52Id. at 459-60. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court held that §
1981 covers employment discrimination in the aspects of contract formation and
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
In doing so, the Supreme Court further confirmed that a § 1981 plaintiff
is entitled to recover compensatory and, when appropriate, punitive
damages. 53
In Smith v. Wade,' the Supreme Court expanded the applicability of
punitive damages under § 1981. More specifically, the Court addressed the
standard required forpunitive damages under42 U.S.C. § 1983.as Although
the decision interprets § 1983, courts generally refer to the Smith standard
as also applicable to § 1981. In Smith, the defendant argued that the
appropriate standard for punitive damages was "actual malicious
intent-'ill will, spite, or intent to injure.' "- The Court noted that the
majority of jurisdictions had concluded that a showing of "recklessness,
serious indifference to or disregard for the rights of others, or even gross
negligence" 7 would suffice, thereby stopping short of requiring a showing
of actual ill will, spite or intent to injure.S As a result, the Court determined
that it would follow the common law standard, so that "reckless or callous
disregard for the plaintiff's rights, as well as intentional violations of
federal law," 9 are sufficient to allow a jury to consider whether a punitive
damage award is warranted.6
contract enforcement, but declined to read the section to include racial harassment
based on the "make and enforce contracts" language of § 198 1(a). Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1989). The Civil Rights Act of 1991
amended § 1981 by stating, "the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the
enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat
1071, 1072 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)). In doing so,
Congress overruled Patterson and expanded the causes of action available to a §
1981 plaintiffto be parallel to the causes of action available to a Title VII plaintiff.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
53 Johnson, 421 U.S. at460; see, e.g., Lee v. S. Home Sites Corp. 429 F.2d290,
294 (5th Cir. 1970); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965); Gaston v.
Gibson, 328 F. Supp. 3,5-6 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Tracy v. Robbins, 40 FIR.D. 108,
113 (W.D.S.C. 1966); Brooks v. Moss, 242 F. Supp. 531, 532 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
For examples of differences with respect to damages under § 1981 and damages
under Title VII, see infra Part IV.




58 Id. at 47-48.
59 Id. at 51.
6Old.
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Despite numerous cases subsequent to Johnson and Smith focusing on
the standard required for punitive damages under § 1981, few cases have
addressed whether punitive damages can be awarded absent a finding of
compensatory damages under § 1981. In Carey v. Piphus,61 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the violation of certain absolute rights may entitle
a plaintiff to an award of nominal damages even absent proof of actual
injury.62 In Carey, the plaintiffs brought a claim under § 1983, charging
that they had been suspended from school without procedural due process
of law.63 In considering the elements and prerequisites for recovery of
damages for the students who were suspended without procedural due
process, the Court concluded that in the absence of proof of actual injury,
the students were not entitled to recover compensatory damages, but were
entitled to nominal damages only.61 The Court further elaborated that
through awarding nominal sums of money, "[c]ommon-law courts...
vindicate[ ] [the] deprivation[ ] of certain 'absolute' rights that are not
shown to have caused actual injury."6' In doing so, the Court emphasized
that those rights must be scrupulously observed.'
Although Carey focused on a violation of procedural due process,
courts have relied on the decision to conclude that the right to be free from
discrimination under § 1981 is absolute, and proof of its violation allows
the plaintiff to obtain nominal damages. In Edwards v. Jewish Hospital of
St. Louis,67 for example, the plaintiff filed suit under § 1981 alleging that
the defendant discharged him on the basis of race.6 8 After upholding the
finding of a § 1981 violation,69 the Eighth Circuit stated that "it cannot be
seriously disputed that the right to be free from intentional racial
employment discrimination is absolute in the same sense [as the right to
procedural due process]"' and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to





I Id. Despite discussing the award of nominal damages to vindicate a
deprivation of certain rights, the Court stated that compensatory "damages should
be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or
punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious deprivations of rights." Id.






nominal damages even without demonstrating actual injury.7' As a result,
the court upheld the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiff was not
entitled to any compensatory damages but was entitled to $25,000 in
punitive damages based on the $1 nominal award.' In doing so, the Eighth
Circuit endorsed the principle that a jury could award punitive damages
undet § 1981 although the plaintiff suffered no compensable injury.
Several courts have relied on Johnson and Smith to conclude that a §
1981 plaintiffmayrecoverpunitive damages absent a compensatory award.
In Beaufordv. Sisters ofMercy-Province ofDetroit, Inc.,' for example, an
employee brought suit against his former employer alleging racial
discrimination in violation of § 1981.75 The jury awarded the plaintiff $1
in nominal damages and $150,000 in punitive damages against each of two
defendants.76 In evaluating the defendants' motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict based on the argument that the evidence did not
support an award of punitive damages, the court emphasized that the
defendants were correct in conceding that a plaintiffwho proves a cause of
action under § 1981 may recover punitive damages even when the plaintiff
is entitled to nominal damages only.' Likewise, in Kim v. Dial Service
International, Inc.,8 aNew York court evaluating the relationship between
711d. at 1348-53. Even before courts applied Carey to conclude that proof of
some civil rights violations allow a plaintiffto obtain nominal damages, at least one
court concluded that "[a]s a matter of federal common law it is not necessary to
allege nominal damages and nominal damages are proved by proofofdepriviation
[sic] of a right to which the plaintiffwas entitled." Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87
(3d Cir. 1965).
72 Edwards, 855 F.2d at 1348-53.
13 Soon after Edwards, in Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., the Eighth Circuit again
relied on Carey to reiterate that § 1981 "grants an absolute right to be free of
discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, the violation of which
entitles the victim to nominal damages irrespective of actual injury." Hicks v.
Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 652 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds
by 499 U.S. 914 (1991).
4 Beauford v. Sisters of Mercy-Province of Detroit, Inc., 816 F.2d 1104 (6th
Cir. 1987).
75 Id. at 1106.
76 Id. at 1107.
"Id. at 1108; see also City & Suburban Distributors-Illinois, Inc., v. Stroh
Brewery Co., No. 87-C1409, 1997 WL 311934, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 1997)
(holding that because § 1981 allows for punitive damages based on nominal
awards, the inability to obtain compensatory damages is not an impediment).
7 Kim v. Dial Serv. Int'l, Inc., No. 96 CIV 3327, 1997 WL 458783 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 11, 1997), afl'd, 159 F.3d 1347 (2d Cir. 1998).
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a compensatory award and punitive damage award under a § 1981 claim
noted that "punitive damages may be awarded under § 1981 when the only
non-exemplary damages are nominal damages."" In sum, these cases
demonstrate that a victim of § 1981 discrimination is entitled to an award
of nominal damages, despite suffering no compensable injury, and that
such nominal award is a sufficient basis for a jury to award punitive
damages without awarding compensatory damages.80
B. Section 1983
Enacted in 1871 and entitled "Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights;"
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in material part:
[E]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
8 '
To state a claim under § 1983, the conduct complained of must have been
committed by an individual or entity acting under the color of state law and
must have deprived the plaintiff of a right or privilege secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.82 Section 1983 was intended to
create "a species of tort liability"8 3 in favor of persons deprived of
79 Id. at *15.
80 While the standard of proof for imposition of punitive damages must be met
in all circumstances when punitive damages are considered, when there is a low
award of compensatory damages or where the monetary value of noneconomic
harm may be difficult to determine, a high award of punitive damages may be
justified, but it must still be reasonable. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 582-83 (1996); Edwards v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345, 1352
(8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that "[teo apply the proportionality rule to a nominal
damages award would invalidate mostpunitive damages awards because only very
low punitive damage awards could be said to bear a reasonable relationship to the
amount of a nominal damages award"). But cf, Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F. Supp. 2d
170, 186 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that "[b]ecause no compensable damages were
found by the jury, only a small punitive damages award is appropriate").
a' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
82 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,48 (1988); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1980).
13 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,417 (1976).
2000-2001]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
federally-secured rights.84 Unlike § 1981, which allows a private suit based
on intentional race discrimination and does not involve a public official, a
§ 1983 action involves a public employee who, while acting within his
official capacity, allegedly violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 5
Although Congress did not directly address the issue of damages when
it enacted § 1983, subsequent court decisions have held that both
compensatory and punitive damages are available to a § 1983 plaintiff. In
Carey v. Piphus,"6 prior to concluding that the violation of certain absolute
rights may entitle a plaintiff to an award of nominal damages even absent
proof of actual damages,87 the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that
compensatory damages are available to a § 1983 plaintiff.88 Thereafter, in
Smith v. Wade, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that punitive damages
are available in § 1983 actions to advance the statute's purpose of securing
the protection of constitutional rights? ° The Court pointed to an earlier
decision in which it concluded that "[b]y allowing juries and courts to
assess punitive damages in appropriate circumstances... § 1983 directly
advances the public's interest in preventing repeated constitutional
deprivations... [and ensures] protection against the prospect that a public
official may engage in recurrent constitutional violations." 9' After doing
so, the Court noted that such policies and purposes of § 1983 suggest no
reason to allow less relief for violations of constitutional rights than for
ordinary torts.92 Thereafter, the Court concluded "that a jury may be
permitted to assess punitive damages under § 1983 when the defendant's
conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it
involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
others."93
11 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,34 (1983); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,253
(1978); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417.
85 West, 487 U.S. at 50.
86 Carey, 435 U.S. at 247.
s71d. at 266.
88 Id. at 256-57. In Carey, the Court also noted in dicta that "[tihis is not to say
that exemplary or punitive damages might not be awarded in a proper case under
§ 1983 with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing violations of
constitutional rights." Id. at 257 n.11.
89 Smith, 461 U.S. at 30.
90 Id. at35.
91 Id. at 36 n.5 (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269-70
(1981)).
92Id. at 48-49.
93 1d. at 56.
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Unlike the § 1981 context, where relatively few cases have discussed
awardingpunitive damages without an accompanying compensatory award,
it is well established that when ajury finds a constitutional violation under
§ 1983, it may award punitive damages even without awarding
compensatory damages.9 To do so, courts often rely on Carey v. Piphus9O
and emphasize that when a jury concludes that the plaintiff has proven a
constitutional violation, but has not shown injury sufficient to warrant a
compensatory damage award, the plaintiff is entitled to an award of at least
nominal damages as a matter oflaw.9 Thereafter, courts regularly conclude
that a finding of liability and subsequent nominal award will suffice as the
basis for a jury's punitive award under § 1983.97
IV. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
A. Background of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" represents a landmark in
employment discrimination legislation. Title VII protects employees
I See, e.g., King v. Macri, 993 F.2d 294,298 (2d Cir. 1993); Davis v. Locke,
936 F.2d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir. 1991); Erwin v. County of Manitowoc, 872 F.2d
1292, 1299 (7th Cir. 1989); Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir.
1986); Baltezore v. Concordia Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 767 F.2d 202, 208 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1985); Goodwin v. Circuit Court of St Louis County, Mo., 729 F.2d 541,548
(8th Cir. 1984); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 976 (5th Cir. 1983); Lamar v.
Steele, 693 F.2d 559,563 (5th Cir. 1982); Wilson v. Taylor, 658 F.2d 1021, 1033
(5th Cir. Unit B Oct. 1981); McCulloch v. Glasgow, 620 F.2d 47, 51 (5th Cir.
1980).
91 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
1 See Robinson v. Cattaraugus County, 147 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 1998);
LeBlanc-Stemberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 431 (2d Cir. 1995); Gibeau v. Nellis,
18 F.3d 107, 110-11 (2d Cir. 1994); Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783,789 (2d Cir.
1984); Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F. Supp. 2d 170, 182 (W.D.N.Y. 1999); Perez v.
Cucci, 725 F. Supp. 209, 257 n.36 (D.N.J. 1989), affd, 898 F.2d 142 (3d Cir.
1990).
97SeeZarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52, 55-56 (2dCir. 1978); Basistav. Weir, 340
F.2d 74, 86-88 (3d Cir. 1965); Mansell v. Saunders, 372 F.2d 573, 576 (1st Cir.
1967); Brooks v. Shipman, 503 F. Supp. 40, 44-45 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aft'd, 681
F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1982); Lamb v. Cartwright, 393 F. Supp. 1081, 1085 (E.D. Tex.
1975), aff'd, 524 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1975); supra note 94.
98 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,253 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e.-17(1994)).
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against discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin and religion
in the employment relationship." From the start, the Act gave courts the
authority to award back pay and any other equitable remedies deemed
appropriate to eradicate discrimination in the workplace.10W Although the
Act did not state that compensatory and punitive damages were prohibited
under Title VII, courts regularly construed the damages provision as
prohibiting such relief 10' In 1991, however, Congress amended the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to add compensatory and punitive damages as Title VII
remedies for unlawful intentional discrimination."° The 1991 Act greatly
altered the landscape of employment discrimination law by permitting
additional remedies to deter discrimination and by offering greater
protection to victims of intentional discrimination. 10 3
The most significant factor prompting the need for the 1991 revisions
was the disparity among the remedies and protections available under the
9 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
100 Civil Rights Actof 1964 § 706,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994). Section 2000e-
5(g)(1) currently states:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in... an
unlawful employment practice... , the court may enjoin the respondent
from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay... , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
Id.
101 While an argument exists for construing the section as permitting compen-
satory and punitive damages, such as in Claiborne v. Illinois CentralRailroad, 401
F. Supp. 1022, 1026-27 (E.D. La. 1975), aff'd inpart, vacated inpart, 583 F.2d
143 (5th Cir. 1978), courts unanimously rejected compensatory and punitive
damages as available remedies under Title VII.
102 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(a)(1). Section
198la(a)(1) states that:
In an action brought by a complaining party under 706 or 717 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964... against a respondent who engaged in unlawful
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful
because of its disparate impact).., and provided that the complaining party
cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may
recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b)
of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706 (g) of the
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various federal civil rights statutes."° Congress realized that discrimination
victims who suffered identical treatment received greater protection and
reliefunder § 1981 and § 1983 than under Title VII,'0 thereby suggesting
that the Title VII remedy was inadequate and impeded unity among the
federal civil rights statutes. More specifically, because § 1981 protected
against racial discrimination only and allowed for compensatory and
punitive damages, victims of other forms ofdiscrimination-who were not
entitled to compensatory or punitive damages under Title VII-recovered
smaller awards than victims of race discrimination. °6 As a result, section
102 of the 1991 Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, allows a complaining
party to collect compensatory damages, which "make discrimination
victims whole for the terrible injury to their careers,... health, and...
self-respect" caused by their employer's discriminatory conduct.101
Likewise, it allows for punitive damage awards, 8 which are intended to
punish employers for their unlawful conduct, reinforce public policy
against discrimination, and add to the deterrent value of damage awards.' 9
101 See Michael W. Roskiewicz, Note, Title VllRemedies: Lifting the Statutory
Caps From the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Achieve Equal Remedies for
EmploymentDiscrimination, 43 WASH. U. J.URB. &CONTEMP.L. 391,397 (1993).
Other factors that motivated Congress towards the 1991 amendments included the
heightened awareness of hostility towards minorities and women in the workplace,
the widespread effects of sexual harassment in American society, and the
expansion of state employment discrimination laws. Id. at 397-400.
105 Id. at 397.
'0o Id. & n.30.
07 H.R.REP.No. 102-40(1), at65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
603. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the primary enforcement
mechanism against Title VII discrimination, stated the following with respect to
compensatory damages under the 1991 Act:
Damages are available for the intangible injuries of emotional harm such as
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of
enjoyment of life. Other nonpecuniary losses could include injury to
professional standing, injury to character and reputation, injury to credit
standing, loss of health, and any other nonpecuniary losses that are incurred
as a result of the discriminatory conduct.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMM'N, supra note 49, 2062, at 2071.
10842 U.S.C. § 198 la(a)(1) (1994).
109 See 137 CONG. REC. H9526 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Edwards). In determining punitive damage awards, "[t]he jury is to be guided by
the same principles that have traditionally guided... [punitive damage awards,
including] the amount necessary to punish the defendant for its conduct and to
deter the defendant and other employers from engaging in... [similar future
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Indeed, § 1981a again confirmed that, unlike in former times, it is now
well-settled that punitive damages are proper to punish defendants for
improper and illegal behavior.
While § 1981a took major steps to unify the remedies among the
federal civil rights statutes, the relief available and the process for
obtaining such relief remains more favorable under § 1981 and § 1983.110
First, there are no administrative and filing prerequisites to bring a claim
under § 1981 or § 1983. Such actions may be brought directly in state or
federal court and because there is no federal limitations period, the
appropriate state statute of limitations is followed."'1 In contrast, Title VII
actions cannot proceed in federal court unless a charge of discrimination
has first been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice.1
Second, unlike Title VII, "[§ 1981] provide[s] protection to victims of
discrimination regardless of the size of the employer and allow[s] recovery
of back pay for an indefinite period of time."'1 3 In contrast, Title VII
conduct]" Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 1997).
110 While a plaintiffmay bring aprivate race discrimination claim under § 1981
and Title VII, state action must be present for a plaintiff to assert such a claim
under § 1983. See supra note 48 and accompanying text Envisioning that parties
would bring simultaneous actions under § 1981 and Title VII, § 1981a enables
complaining parties to recover compensatory and punitive damages for unlawful
intentional discrimination provided they cannot recover such damages under §
1981.42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994); see Dunning v. Gen. Elec. Co., 892 F. Supp.
1424, 1427-31 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (finding that damages are available under § 1981a
only where there can be no double recovery); Earvin v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 67
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 481,482 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (considering claims under
§ 1981 and Title VII and dismissing the Title VII claims, thereby concluding "that
the Title VII claim duplicate[d] the relief available under § 1981 and should be
dismissed"). In sum, Congress explicitly prevented double recovery under § 1981
and § 198 la, while emphasizing that nothing in § 198 la should "be construed to
limit the scope of, or the relief available under, § 1981." 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(b)(4).
1 Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454,463-64 (1975).
11242 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(l) (1994); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,
256 (1980); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'nv. DinubaMed. Clinic, 222
F.3d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 2000). The time for filing a charge with the EEOC is
"extended to 300 days if the charge is initially filed with a state agency that
enforces its own anti-discrimination laws." Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)
(1994). A charge initially filed with a state agency will be treated as constructively
filed with the EEOC upon either the expiration of sixty days or the termination of
the agency proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1994).
113 Roskiewicz, supra note 104, at 396-97.
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applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees 14 and allows a
victim to recover back pay for discrimination accruing not more than two
years prior to the filing of a charge with the EEOC."5 Most importantly,
unlike § 1981 and § 1983, § 1981a caps the amount of compensatory and
punitive damages an employee may recover depending on the size of the
employer, with no plaintiffrecovering in excess of $300,000.116 Such caps
reflect a compromise balancing an employee's interest in protection from
discrimination against an employer's interest in guarding against financial
ruin and frivolous lawsuits. Despite the caps, which proved to be
"442 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
"5 Id. § 2000e-5(g)(1); see Cynthia L. Alexander, The Defeat ofthe Civil Rights
Act of1990: Wading Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 595, 621-25 (1991); James L. Hughes et al., Back Pay in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 35 VAND. L. REv. 893 (1982).
1642 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994). Section 198 la(b)(3) provides that:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this
section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under
this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than
101 employees..., $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than
201 employees .... $100,000; and
(C) in the case ofa respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than
501 employees..., $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees
... , $300,000.
Id. As a result of the caps, Congress seemed to codify the very disparity it
attempted to correct Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, victims of racial
discrimination could recover unlimited compensatory and punitive damages under
§ 1981, while Title VII limited victims of other forms of discrimination to equitable
remedies. Under § 1981a, courts maintain discretion to award relief for claims
pursuant to § 1981, while victims of non-racial discrimination can recover an
amount based on the size of the employer. Interestingly, however, very few
punitive damage awards in the § 1981 context have exceeded the Title VII statutory
cap provision. SeeWendy White etal., Analysis of Damage Awards Under Section
1981 (Mar. 14, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Initially, without being influenced by the statutory caps, the jury sets the
punitive damageaward. Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 1 10F.3d210, 221 (2d Cir. 1997).
Then, if the total of the compensatory and punitive awards exceeds the relevant
cap, the district court will reduce the total award to ensure that it does not surpass
the cap for an employer of the defendant's size. Id.
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controversial, 117 it is important to note that economic damages, such as lost
wages that have occurred at the time of suit, are not included under the caps
of § 1981a."' Rather, lost wages were provided for prior to § 1981a and
are, therefore, fully compensable regardless of the amount or size of the
employer." 9 Finally, unlike under § 1981 and § 1983,12 a Title VII
violation does not automatically result in anominal damage award. Instead,
a Title VII plaintiff must request a jury instruction regarding nominal
damages.1
2 1
Since the passage of § 198 la, juries have regularly awarded com-
pensatory and punitive damages to victims of unlawful intentional
discrimination under Title VII.'2 Many of these awards, however, have
not gone uncontested in post-trial motions. While Title VII defen-
dants often make a motion for a new trial"' or a motion for remitti-
"I See Roskiewicz, supra note 104, at 393-94.
118 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(b)(3) (1994).
19 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994)). Because back pay is
provided for in § 2000e-5(g), it is excluded from compensatory damages under the
1991 Act "to prevent double recovery." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 253 (1994); see 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(b)(2).
12 See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
121 See Buckner v. Franco, Inc., No. 97-6028, 1999 WL 232704, at *4 (6&h Cir.
Apr. 12, 1999) (concluding that nominal damages are not required for violations
ofTitle VI); Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205, 1215 & n.6 (lst Cir.
1995) (" '[n]othing in Carey mandates the award of nominal damages' in a Title
VII case") (quoting Walkerv. Anderson Elec. Connectors, 944 F.2d 841,845 (1 th
Cir. 1991)).
' See, e.g., Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132 F.3d 978 (4th Cir. 1997); Delph
v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. of Paragould, 130 F.3d 349 (8th Cir. 1997); Jonasson
v. Lutheran Child & Family Servs., 115 F.3d 436 (7th Cir. 1997); Luciano v.
Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 1997); Hearn v. Gen. Elec. Co., 927 F. Supp.
1486 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Williams v. Pharmacia Opthalmics, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 791
(N.D. Ind. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944 (7th
Cir. 1998); Probst v. Reno, 917 F. Supp. 554 (N.D. 111. 1995); Reynolds v. Octel
Communications Corp., 924 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Tex. 1995); Emmel v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Chicago, 904 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. I1. 1995), aft'd, 95 F.3d 627(7th
Cir. 1996); Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 879 F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
Victims of unintentional discrimination, known as disparate impact discrimination,
are not entitled to compensatory and punitive damages under § 198 la. 42 U.S.C.
§ 198la(a)(1) (1994).
" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides that:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of
the issues... in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of
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tur,24 thereby forcing the court to evaluate the amount of the punitive
damages award,'"1 some defendants challenge the award itself, thereby
forcing the court to determine if punitive damages are justified at all. A
common challenge, one which has produced a federal circuit split, is
whether a jury can award punitive damages after concluding that the
plaintiff did not suffer any compensable injury under § 198 la.
B. Section 1981a Punitive Damage Awards Without a § 1981a
Compensatory or Nominal Damage Award?
1. Courts That Do Not Require a Compensatory Award
a. Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc.
In Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc.,126 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed whether a compensatory award
must accompany a punitive damage award under § 1981a. Patricia
Hennessy, a former sales employee ofPenril,'"7 brought suit against Penril
and her individual supervisor alleging claims of sex and pregnancy
discrimination in violation of Title VII.' After finding liability, the jury
did not award Hennessy any compensatory damages, but awarded punitive
damages totaling $350,000.129 Pursuant to post trial motions, the court
awarded Hennessy back pay and ordered Penril to reinstate her to her
employment position. 3 On appeal, Penril argued that Hennessy was not
the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at
law in the courts of the United States.
FED. R. Crv. P. 59(a).
12 "Remittitur is the process by which a court compels a plaintiff to choose
between reduction of an excessive verdict and a new trial." Shu-Tao Lin v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 742 F.2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1984).
'25 In a federal question case, a district court has discretion to conclude that a
damage "award [is] excessive if it 'shock[s] the judicial conscience' by resulting
in a miscarriage ofjustice." Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d 1,
18 (2d Cir. 1996) (second alteration in original) (quoting Matthews v. CTI
Container Tramnsp. Int'l Inc., 871 F.2d 270,278 (2d Cir. 1980).
'"Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995).
127 Id. at 1347.
128 Id. at 1348-49.
129 Id. at 1349.
130 Id. Because Title VII does not cover supervisor liability, Hennessey's
supervisor was dismissed from the case. Id. The court also reduced the punitive
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entitled to any punitive damage award because the jury denied her
compensatory damages."' To support its contention, Penril relied on a
series of Illinois common law tort cases holding that "punitive damages
may not be assessed in the absence of compensatory damages."132 The
Seventh Circuit, however, immediately rejected Penril's reliance on Illinois
common law and emphasized that the present case was a federal civil rights
action under Title VI, which is governed by the damage provisions found
in § 198 a 33
The court then focused on § 1981a. First, the court stressed that
"[n]othingin the plain language of§ 198laconditions an award ofpunitive
damages on an underlying award ofcompensatory damages."" Second, the
court emphasized that unlike compensatory damages at common law,
which include back pay, § 198 la 35 prohibits the jury to consider back pay
as an element of compensatory damages. 36 Specifically, back pay is not
included in § 1981a 3 1 because it is provided for in an earlier section of
Title VIL,13 thereby preventing double recovery. 39 As a result, the court
damage award against Penril to $100,000, and granted Hennessy's petition for
attorney's fees and costs. Id.
131Id. at 1351. Penril simultaneously argued thatthe evidence was notsufficient
to establish that the plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages. Id.
32Id. at 1352.
133 Id.
I Id. Damages in cases of unlawful intentional discrimination in employment
are defined at42 U.S.C. § 198 la(b). Section 198la(b)(1) provides inpertinentpart
A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section
against a respondent (other than a government, government agency or
political subdivision) if the complaining party demonstrates that the
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices
with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of
an aggrieved individual.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
135 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (1994).
'36 Hennessy, 69 F.3d at 1352. The court noted that Penril's effort to apply
general Illinois tort law to a federal civil rights case was particularly inappropriate
for this reason. Id.
137 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) (1994). "Compensatory damages awarded under
this section shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of
relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."
1
38 Id. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
'39,"Backpay is excluded from compensatory damages under§ 102 of the 1991
Act 'to prevent double recovery.'"Hennessy, 69 F.3d at 1352 (quoting Landgraf
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,253 (1994)).
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noted that the trial court properly "instructed the jury that it was not to
award [Hennessy] back pay as an element of compensatory damages
' 14
under § 1981a. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit agreed that the lower
court's subsequent award of back pay pursuant to Title VII was properly
thought of as compensatory in nature because it was "compensation for
injury at the hands of defendants."'' Without suggesting that a back pay
award under Title VII was required in such situation, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the jury's consideration ofpunitive damages under § 198 1a
was appropriate despite its failure to award compensatory damages under
§ 1981a.142
b. Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating Inc.
In Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc.,"3 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit expanded on its reasoning in Hennessy'" and
determined that neither a compensatory nor a nominal damage award must
accompany a punitive damage award under § 198 la.145 Charmaine Timm,
a former employee of Progressive Steel Treating ("Progressive"), brought
a Title VII sexual harassment action against Progressive." Timm testified
that her co-worker frequently grabbed and pinched her buttocks, touched
her thighs, and made frequent sexual comments and propositions. 47 Timm
further testified that she complained to her supervisor, but that nothing was
done. 148 After six months of employment with Progressive, Timm
voluntarily left her employment."9 At the close of the jury trial, Timm did
not request an instruction on nominal damages. 50 The jury concluded that
140Id.
141 Id
1 2 Id. In a later section of the opinion, the court emphasized that the jury could
have awarded punitive damages in the case. Id. at 1356. It concluded, however, that
the case was not "so egregious that an award at 100 percent of what can legally be
awarded against a company of Peril's size is appropriate." Id. As a result, the court
vacated the punitive award and remanded the matter to the district court to decide
the amount of punitive damages. Id.
" 3 Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).
14 Hennessy, 69 F.3d at 1344.








Progressive was liable for violating Timm's Title VII rights, but did not
award Timm any compensatory awardunder § 1981a.151 Also, the court did
not award Timm any back pay.152 The jury, however, awarded Timm
punitive damages under § 1981a.11 Progressive appealed, alleging that
punitive damages cannot be awarded when a jury has determined that a
plaintiff did not suffer any compensable injury. 'I
In rejecting Progressive's argument, the court relied on its reasoning
in Hennessy, where it concluded that punitive damages are available under
§ 1981a even when the jury does not assess compensatory damages.155
Nonetheless, Progressive argued further that Hennessy was distinguishable
because, unlike the present case, there the plaintiffwas awarded back pay
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), a Title VII damage provision. The Seventh
Circuit rejected the notion that an award of back pay under Title VII is
determinant in allowing a jury to award punitive damages under § 198 la
when it has not awarded compensatory damages under § 1981a.156 Rather,
the court noted that the fact that the plaintiff found better-paying
work-and thus did not receive back pay as a result-does not preclude
other remedies,'$' including those available under § 198 Ia.
5 1
To further support its conclusion that neither a back pay nor
compensatory damage award is required to accompany a punitive damage
award, the court focused on a statutory analysis.159 First, the court reiterated
its statement in Hennessy, emphasizing that "'[n]othing in the plain
language of § 1981a conditions an award of punitive damages on an
underlying award of compensatory damages.' "'I Second, the court relied
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 jurisprudence.'6 1 In doing so, the court emphasized the
longstanding rule that "when a jury finds a constitutional violation under
a § 1983 claim, it may award punitive damages even when it does not
'51 Id.
11Id. In a Title VII action, the court-and not the jury-awards back pay. See
infra note 205.







"oId. (alteration in original) (quoting Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks,
Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995)).
161 Id.
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award compensatory damages."'62 Specifically, the court cited several cases
emphasizing that punitive damages are available following a finding of a
§ 1983 violation and a nominal damage award even if the plaintiff has
suffered no actual injury. 163 Thereafter, the court reiterated the goal and
practice of uniformity with respect to enforcing the civil rights laws and,
as a result, found "[N1o reason... for reading a compensatory-punitive link
into § 1981a or Title VII but not [into] § 1983."'16 Indeed, in Timm, the
Seventh Circuit made it clear that a jury could award punitive damages
under § 1981a without awarding either compensatory damages under §
1981a or any other "compensatory-like' 65 damages under Title VII.'1
162 Id. (quoting Erwin v. Manitowoc County, 872 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir.
1989)).
163 See Sahigian v. Dickey, 827 F.2d 90, 100 (7th Cir. 1987); McKinley v.
Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1326 (7th Cir. 1984).
'6 Timm, 137 F.3d at 1010.
65 "Compensatory-like" damages refers to back pay relief, which is provided
for in section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(g), 78 Stat. 241, 261 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994)). Nominal damages, which are not compensation for
loss or injury but are recognition of a violation, are not compensatory-like. See
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978).
6 Timm, 137 F.3d at 1008-11. Less than two months after Timm, in Paciorek
v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan relied on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning. Paciorek v. Mich.
Consol. Gas Co., 179 F.R.D. 216,220-21 (E.D. Mich. 1998). The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant, her former employer, discriminated against her on the basis of
her sex in violation of Title VII and Michigan state laws. Id. at 217. The plaintiff
also brought a claim for intentional disability discrimination and failure to
reasonably accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), Americans with Disabilities Actof 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,104 Stat.
327 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12213 (1994) and in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.), and also asserted several common law claims. Paciorek, 179
F.R.D. at217-18. Aftera trial, thejury returned a verdict finding thatthe defendant
violated the ADA by failing to accommodate the plaintiff's disability, but did not
find any liability on the remaining claims. Id. at 218. As a result, the jury awarded
the plaintiff $30,000 in punitive damages, but did not award any compensatory
damages. Id. The plaintiffnever requested a nominal damages instruction, nor was
one ever given. Id.
In post-trial motions, the defendant requested that the court vacate the punitive
damage award because the plaintiff "failed to obtain either compensatory or
nominal damages." Id. at 220. In doing so, the defendant relied on the traditional
tort principle, found in comments (b) and (c) to section 908 of the Restatement
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Furthermore, the court did not indicate or suggest that a nominal damage
award is required to accompany such award. 167
c. Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp.
Most recently, in Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., " the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York followed the Seventh
Circuit's reasoning in Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc." The
plaintiff alleged that while employed at Adchem's Westbury, New York,
facility, "she suffered repeated unwelcome sexual advances and comments
from her supervisor.""17 The plaintiff further alleged that she complained
about the behavior, but that no action was taken.' 7' Eventually, she was able
to transfer to another Adchem plant but grew dissatisfied with the new
plant and asked to transfer back to her original Adchem location, although
requesting an intermediate layer of supervision between her andheralleged
harasser. 72 A few months following her transfer back to Westbury, the
(Second) of Torts, that a "claimant may not recover punitive damages without first
establishing liability for either compensatory or nominal damages." Id.
Immediately, however, the court rejected the application of traditional torts theory
to federal civil rights claims, emphasizing that the Seventh Circuit has held that 42
U.S.C. § 198 la, which specifically authorizes compensatory and punitive damages,
defines when punitive damages may be granted. Id. Furthermore, the court noted
that 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(a)(2) states that those who bring successful ADA "failure
to accommodate claims" may recover compensatory and punitive damages as
allowed in 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(b). Id. at221. Thereafter, the court cited several Title
VII and § 1983 cases where punitive damages have been awarded with the absence
of compensatory damages. Id. at 220. See generally Timm, 137 F.3d at 1008;
Hennessyv. PenrilDatacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995); Erwin
v. County of Manitowoc, 872 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1989). The court then endorsed
the Seventh Circuit's reasoning for finding a sharp distinction between state
common law and federal civil rights legislation and reiterated that"[e]xtra-statutory
requirements for recovery should not be invented." Paciorek, 179 FR.ID. at 221
(alteration in original) (quoting Timm, 137 F.3d at 1010). Indeed, the court
emphasized that there is nothing within § 198 la that conditions punitive damages
upon an award of compensatory or nominal damages. Id. As a result, the court
upheld the Plaintiff's punitive damage award. Id. at 221-22.
167 Paciorek, 179 F.R.D. at 221.
1' Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
169 Id. at 299.
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plaintiff "suffered an unrelated on-the-job injury, and never returned to
Adchem."' The plaintiff then commenced an action, alleging sexual
harassment and retaliation in violation of the New York State Human
Rights Law and Title VII.174
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on her sexual
harassment claim and awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in punitive damages
under § 1981a, 75 but did not award any compensatory damages. 7 6
Furthermore, the plaintiff did not request a nominal damages instruction
and no such damages were awarded.'"
After noting that various views exist with respect to the issue at hand,
the court, like Hennessy7 8 and Timm,'79 noted that nothing in the text of§
198 la requires a compensatory award to accompany a punitive award. 80
Thereafter, the court followed the Seventh Circuit's reliance on § 1983
jurisprudence to reiterate that "an award of compensatory damages is not
a prerequisite to the jury awarding punitive damages"'8 ' to a victim of a §
1983 violation. 8 2 As a result, the court saw "no reason... for reading a
compensatory-punitive link into... Title VII but not Section 1983."'I In
sum, like Timm, the court concluded that there is no requirement that a
compensatory award accompany a punitive damage award under §
198 la.14 Unlike Timm, however, the court explicitly stated that there is no
173 Id.
174 Id. at 296-97.
11 Although the plaintiffalleged "sexual harassment claims.., under both Title
VII and the New York State Human Rights Law, the propriety of the punitive
damage award must be assessed only under federal law, as punitive damages are
not available under the [New York] State Human Rights Law." Id. at 298-99.
176 Id. at 298.
17 Id. at 297. The court stated that because plaintiff made no request for a
nominal damage award, the court "need not decide whether the [p]Ilaintiff was
entitled to a nominal damage award, as a matter of law." Id. at 299. The court
noted, however, that various cases have made it clear that a nominal damage award
is permitted underTitle VII, but is notmandatory. Id.; see, e.g., Kerr-Selgas v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205 (1st Cir. 1995).
7I Hennessy v. PenrilDatacommNetworks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995).
179 Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).
"0 Cush-Crawford, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
181 Id.
182 Id.
83 Id. (omissions in original) (quoting Timm, 137 F.3d at 1010).
,84 Id. Three months prior to Cush-Crawford, the same court briefly touched
upon this issue. In Fernandez v. North Shore Orthopedic Surgery & Sports
Medicine, P.C., the plaintiff brought two causes of action based on retaliation in
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requirement that a nominal damage award accompany a punitive damage
award under § 1981a.
2. Courts Requiring a Compensatory,
"Compensatory-Like, " or Nominal Damage Award
a. Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc.
In Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc.,' the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit concluded that an award of punitive damages under §
1981a must be accompanied by a compensatory award under § 1981a or,
at a minimum, by a nominal damage award.186 In Kerr-Selgas, Mary Jane
Kerr-Selgas brought a suit against her former employer alleging sex
discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under both Puerto Rico
law and Title VI1.'87 After a jury trial, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico entered judgment against the defendants for
$2,000,000 in compensatory damages for claims arising under Puerto Rico
law; $350,000 in punitive damages for claims arising under Title VII; and
$20,000 in severance pay on the wrongful discharge claim. 88
violation of Title VII. Fernandez v. N. Shore Orthopedic Surgery & Sports
Med., P.C., 79 F. Supp. 2d 197,200 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). The jury awarded $100,000
in back pay, $160,000 in front pay, and $100,000 in punitive damages-all under
§ 198 Ia. Id. Subsequently, the defendant moved for a motion for new trial or
remittitur, arguing that the verdict finding was against the weight of the evidence
and excessive. Id. In evaluating the amount of the jury's punitive damage award,
the court noted that "the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages...
[was] extremely high . . . [because] the jury did not award [the plaintiff]
compensatory damages." Id. at 208. Rather, the non-punitive damages awarded
were back pay and front pay awards, both which are excluded from the
compensatory damage definition in § 198la(b)(2), but are included in Title VII.
Thereafter, the court evaluated other factors to determine if the punitive damage
award was excessive and determined that an award of $50,000 rather than
$100,000 was appropriate. Id. As a result, the court allowed the jury to award
punitive damages under § 1981a where it had not awarded any compensatory
award under § 198 la. Nonetheless, the court did not discuss whether it considered
the back pay or front pay award to be compensatory-like and, as such, to be the
basis for the jury's punitive award.85 Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205 (lst Cir. 1995).
'861d. at 1215.
'17 Id at 1207.
188Id. at 1209.
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On appeal, the First Circuit evaluated the apportionment ofdamages. 18 9
In doing so, the court concluded that while the district court "supportably
ascribed the entire compensatory damages award to the... [claims arising
under Puerto Rico law], its ruling casts doubt upon any punitive damages
award on the federal claims."'90 Relying on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts9' and CooperDistributing Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.,'9 a state
law tort case, the defendant argued that generally "a claimant may not
recover punitive damages without establishing liability for either
compensatory or nominal damages."' 93 Because the jury did not award any
compensatory damages based on Kerr-Selgas's Title VII claims, the court
then sought to determine if she was entitled to nominal damages based on
her Title VII claims, despite her failure to request such relief'
94
In evaluating the practice of awarding nominal damages in employment
discrimination actions, the court looked to decisions under § 1981. The
court noted Hicks v. Brown Group Inc.,95 where the Eighth Circuit relied
on Carey v. Piphus,1 to conclude that a § 1981 violation entitled the
victim to nominal damages irrespective ofactual injury. 97 Nonetheless, the
court emphasized that nothing in Carey mandates a nominal damages
award in a Title VII case. 9 As a result and unlike that which occurs after
a finding of § 1981 or § 1983 liability, the court concluded that a finding
of liability under Title VII does not compel an award of nominal damages
absent a timely request.'9 The court concluded that because Kerr-Selgas's
Title VII punitive damage award was accompanied by neither a Title VII
189 Id. at 1214.
190 Id.
191 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmts. b-c (1964).
192 Cooper Distrib. Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262 (3d Cir.
1995). In Cooper, the jury found for Cooper on its claim for tortious interference
with prospective business advantage, but did not award compensatory damages.Id.
at 281. The jury did, however, award $3,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. On
appeal, the court concluded that a failure to award compensatory damages on the
claim, and Cooper's failure to request a nominal damage instruction, precluded an
award of punitive damages. Id. at 282-83.
1
93 Kerr-Selgas, 69 F.3d at 1214.
"9 Id.
"I Hicks v. Brown Group Inc., 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated on other
grounds by 499 U.S. 914 (1991).
19 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
97 Kerr-Selgas, 69 F.3d at 1214-15.




compensatory damage award noratimelyrequest for nominal damages, her
punitive damage award should be vacated.200
In sum, unlike other courts that rejected reliance on general tort
principles in assessing damage awards under the federal civil rights
statutes, the First Circuit did rely on general tort principles to hold that an
award of punitive damages must be accompanied by a compensatory or
nominal damage award.
b. Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Division of Melville Corp.
Three years later, inProvencherv. CVS Pharmacy, Division ofMelville
Corp.,20 1 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit faced for a second time
the question whether a jury could award punitive damages to a Title VII
plaintiffwho did not suffer any compensable injury.2 2 Richard Provencher,
an assistant manager of one of the defendant's stores, brought suit against
CVS Pharmacy, alleging Title VII claims of sexual harassment and
retaliation.0 3 The jury found that CVS retaliated against Provencher for
filing a sexual harassment claim and awarded him $8000 in punitive
damages but no compensatory damages.20 4 Based on the jury's finding of
liability, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire awarded
Provencher back pay totaling approximately $10,000 and front paytotaling
approximately $14 1,000.205
200 Id.
201 Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Div. of Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5 (1st Cir.
1998).
202Id. at 11.
203 Id. at 7-8.
204 Id. at 10. The jury was directed to "award the appropriate amount of
damages for emotional pain and suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, loss of
enjoyment, and necessary counseling, resulting from CVS' retaliation."Id at 10-11
n.3. The jury, however, did not find any such damages. Id.
205 Id. at 11-12. Awards of back pay and front pay are issues for the court to
decide and not for the jury. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994) (stating that a
court may award back pay as equitable relief for a Title VII violation); Winsor v.
Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that equitable
remedies allowable under § 2000e-5(g)(1) include front pay). Front pay may be
awarded where an employer has created an environment where reinstatement is not
a reasonable remedy. In awarding front pay, the court must determine "the amount
required to compensate a victim for the continuing future effects of discrimination
until the victim can be made whole." Carter v. Sedgwick County, Kan., 929 F.2d
1501, 1505 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Relying on the decision in Kerr-Selgas, CVS appealed the punitive
damage award.0 7 In distinguishing the facts of Kerr-Selgas, the court
emphasized that the district court had conditioned its punitive damage
award on its back pay award.2° In contrast, the punitive damage award in
Kerr-Selgas did not rest on "back pay or any remedy which was
compensatory in function."2°9 Further, the court relied on the Seventh
Circuit's analysis in Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc.21 to
conclude that an award of punitive damages and back pay, in the absence
of compensatory damages, is proper under Title VII and § 1981a. 1 In
doing so, the court noted the discussion inHennessy regarding the omission
of back pay from § 198 1a, but further emphasized that back pay is a
"make-whole" remedy that serves as compensation for the injury of lost
wages 12 As a result of the back pay award, the court concluded that the
jury could award punitive damages even without awarding compensatory
damages under § 1981a. Unlike the courts in Timm 4 and Cush-
Crawford,215 the First Circuit in Provencher stopped short of concluding
that a jury could award a punitive damage award without awarding either
a compensatory award under § 198 la or some other compensatory-type2 6
or nominal award under Title VII.
V. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT AMONG THE COURTS
Future courts should apply the reasoning of Timm v. Progressive Steel
Treating, Inc.217 and Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp.211 to conclude that
neither a compensatory damage award of any kind, including back pay, nor
a nominal damage award is a prerequisite for a punitive damage award
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. First, while § 1981a clearly addresses
206 Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205, 1205 (1st Cir. 1995).
2 7 Provencher, 145 F.3d at 11.
208 Id
209 Id.
21o Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995).
2 11 Provencher, 145 F.3d at 12.
212 Id. at 11-12 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 252-53
(1994)).213 Id. at 12.
2 14 Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).
2 15 Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
216 See supra note 165.
217 Timm, 137 F.3d at 1008.
219 Cush-Crawford, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
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compensatory and punitive damage awards, nothing in the plain language
of the statute suggests otherwise.2 9 Second, in enacting § 1981a, Congress
intended to unify the damages provisions of the federal civil rights laws.20
As a result, an award of punitive damages under § 1981a should be
subjected to the same prerequisites as punitive damage awards under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. Third, the absence of back pay or any other type
of economic or compensatory damage award does not, at all, imply that the
victim of Title VII discrimination is not entitled to punitive damages.
Rather, a finding of a Title VII violation should by itself act as a basis for
a jury to consider punitive damages under § 198 la. Fourth, relying on a
jury's apportionment of damages to determine the relief available to a
victim of discrimination could lead to impractical, inconsistent and
unworkable results.
A. The First Circuit Incorrectly Relied on General Tort Principles
Cases such as Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc., which require
a compensatory or nominal award to accompany a punitive damage award
under § 1981a, incorrectly rely on a non-universal tort principle that a
"claimant may not recover punitive damages without establishing liability
for either compensatory or nominal damages." m Other cases such as Timm
and Cush-Crawford, which do not apply this rule, correctly emphasize that
reliance on common law tort principles is incorrect and irrelevant when, as
in this context, the federal statute at issue contains its own damage
provision.22 When analyzing the damage provision of§ 1981 a, those courts
correctly focus on the plain language of the statute. 4 Unlike common law
compensatory damages, which include back pay damages therein, the
language of§ 1981a omits back pay-the most frequent type of economic
compensatory damages. 5 Instead, back pay damages are provided for in
21942 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
220 H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 24-29 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,717-23.
21 Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205 (1st Cir. 1995).
2n Id at 1214.
"1 Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir.
1998); Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299 (E.D.N.Y.
2000).
224 Timm, 137 F.3d at 1010; Cush-Crawford, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 299.
142 U.S.C. § 198 la(b)(2) (1994).
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Title VIL which did not originally allow the compensatory damages
provided for by § 198 Ia.26
Indeed, reliance on state law tort principles serves to only further
divide the courts when deciding if Title VII plaintiffs are entitled to
punitive damages without a compensatory or nominal award. While the
Kerr-Selgas court relied on New Jersey tort law and the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which require at least a nominal award predicate to a
punitive award, 2 7 not all states follow such a rule. Rather, several
jurisdictions significantly contrast the Kerr-Selgas rule by concluding that
a finding of harm or injury-without an award of compensatory or
nomimal damages-is sufficient to support a punitive damage award in tort
actions.' Furthermore, some jurisdictions such as Illinois contrast the
Kerr-Selgas rule by requiring a compensatory damage award predicate to
a punitive damage award in a tort action.?29 As a result, some courts
continue to apply local tort rules to conclude that a compensatory award
226 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994); see also supra notes 119, 165 and
accompanying text. Nothing within the plain language of § 1981a requires, nor
suggests, that a nominal damage award must accompany a punitive damage award.
Unlike § 1981 and § 1983, where courts have concluded that a nominal award
automatically follows a finding of liability, courts have not concluded that such
award accompanies a finding of liability under Title VII. In fact, the few courts that
have addressed this issue have concluded that Title VII does not, in any way,
mandate a nominal damage award upon a finding of liability. See infra note 240
and accompanying text.
227 The Kerr-Selgas court relied on Cooper Distributing Co. v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., where the court reasoned that under New Jersey tort law, a
plaintiff alleging tortious interference with prospective business advantage could
not recover punitive damages in the absence of compensatory damages or, at a
minimum, nominal damages. Kerr-Selgas, 69 F.3d at 1214; CooperDistrib. Co. v.
Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262, 281-83 (3d Cir. 1995). The Kerr-Selgas
court also relied on comments (b) and (c) to section 908 of the Restatement
(Second) ofTorts. Kerr-Selgas, 69 F.3 d at 1214. Comment (c) states in part that"an
award of nominal damages ... is enough to support a further award of punitive
damages." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c, at 464 (1964).
2 Haskins v. Shelden, 558 P.2d 487, 492-93 (Alaska 1976); Brandstetter v.
City Inv. Corp., 243 Cal. Rptr. 431,436 (Ct App. 1988); TopangaCorp. v. Gentile,
58 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719 (Ct. App. 1967); Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454, 456 (Fla.
1989); Pringle Tax Serv., Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1979);
Anderson v. Kammeier, 262 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 1977); Goodale v.
Lachowski, 775 P.2d 888, 890 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).




must accompany a Title VII punitive award while other courts apply local
tort rules to conclude that a nominal award is sufficient. Still other courts
continue to apply local tort rules to conclude that a mere finding of injury
without an award of compensatory or nominal damages permits a Title VII
plaintiff to obtain punitive damages. In sum, allowing courts to rely on
local tort rules when presiding over Title VII cases results in inconsistent
and illogical decisions, serves to confuse § 1981a jurisprudence, and
stymies unification of the various remedies available under the federal civil
rights laws.
B. Further Unifying the Federal Civil Rights Laws
Allowing a punitive damage award without an accompanying
compensatory or nominal award would further effectuate Congress's goal
of creating greater uniformity among the federal civil rights statutes." In
enacting 42 U.S.C. § 198 la, and the damage provisions therein, Congress
intended to unify the remedies and protections among the federal civil
rights statutes." Despite the statutory limits on the total damage award,
Congress extended compensatory and punitive relief to Title VII victims
just as was already available to § 1981 and § 1983 victims? 2 Furthermore,
Congress applied the same standard to punitive damages under § 198 la as
the courts had applied to § 1981 and § 1983.? Likewise, applying the same
rules for awarding punitive damages under § 1981, § 1983 and § 1981a
would further Congress's goal of uniformity while also ensuring
consistency and reliance among the three statutes.
As emphasized in Part III, courts have concluded that under both §
1981 and § 1983, a jury can award punitive damages without awarding
compensatory damages. With Congress's primary intent in mind, courts
such as Timm 4 and Cush-Crawford3 5 have relied on § 1983 cases to
230 The legislative history of the 1991 Amendments to Title VII shows that
Congress sought to unify the law for employment discrimination cases. See H.R.
REP. No. 102-40, pt 2, at 24 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,717.
231 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 24-29 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,717-23.
231 See supra Part I.
213 H.R. REP. No. 120-40, pt. 2, at 24 (199 1), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
694, 717 ("It is the Committee's intention that damages should be awarded under
Title VII in the same circumstances in which such awards are now permitted under
[42] U.S.C. § 1981 in intentional race discrimination cases.').
4 Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).
2S Cush-Crawford v. Adohem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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conclude that § 1981a does not require a compensatory award to
accompany a punitive damage award. 6 In doing so, these courts" 7 have
expanded on the unification goal that Congress intended and which the
courts have frequently emphasized. Furthermore, expanding the "no
compensatory-punitive link" to include Title VII jurisprudence would
allow courts and litigants to rely on all three federal civil rights statutes
when addressing issues pertaining to punitive damages.
By contrast, requiring a compensatory award could prevent further
reliance on other federal civil rights laws, a frequent practice for courts
faced with issues pertaining to punitive damages under the federal civil
rights laws.?38 Similarly, requiring a nominal damage award to accompany
a punitive damage award under § 1981a could create discord, rather than
unity, among the federal civil rights laws. While a finding of liability under
either § 1981 or § 1983 automatically provides the victim with a nominal
damage award,239 the few courts that have considered the issue have
concluded that a Title VII violation does not automatically amount to a
nominal damage award.2 0 Rather, a plaintiff must request that the jury
receive an instruction on nominal damages, thereby placing the decision
whether to award such damages in the jury's hands.24 Indeed, it is likely
that some juries may award nominal damages after finding a Title VII
violation while other juries may not, thereby allowing some-but not
all-Title VII victims to recover punitive damages under § 198 Ia. As a
result, requiring a nominal damage award to accompany a punitive award
under § 1981a could cause inconsistent results within Title VII
jurisprudence. Furthermore, such a rule could create discord between §
1981 and § 1983, where a finding of liability amounts to a nominal damage
award, and Title VII, where a finding of liability does not translate as such.
Indeed, a nominal damage award requirement could act to impede
Congress's goal to unify the protections and remedies of the federal civil
rights statutes.
236 Timm, 137 F.3d at 1008; Cush-Crawford, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
11 See also Paciorek v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 179 F.RLD. 216, 220-21 (E.D.
Mich. 1998).
238 See, e.g., Edwards v. Jewish Hosp. of St Louis, 855 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir.
1988).
2 See supra notes 61-88 and accompanying text
240 See Buckner v. Franco, Inc., No. 97-6028, 1999 WL 232704, at *4 (6th Cir.
1999) ("[T]he one circuit court that has addressed the issue of whether nominal
damages are required for violations of Title VII has held that they are not") (citing
Walker v. Anderson Elec. Connectors, 944 F.2d 841, 845(11th Cir. 1991)).
24 Walker, 944 F.2d at 845.
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C. Other Remedies Should Not Be Extinguished Because Compensatory,
"Compensatory-Like, " or Nominal Damages Are Not Awarded
Remedies routinely available to victims of Title VII discrimination
should not be extinguished merely because a jury does not award
compensatory damages under § 1981a, or any other Title VII
compensatory-like, ornominal damage award. In Timm v. Progressive Steel
Treating, Inc.,242 the court of appeals noted that Timm, a victim of sexual
harassment, voluntarily left her employment for a better job and thus the
court speculated that this may have caused the district court not to award
back pay.243 In fact, the court noted that the jury may have concluded that
she was not entitled to compensatory damages under § 198la because she
voluntarily leftheremployment.2 Nonetheless, the courtreasoned thatthis
should not extinguish other remedies available to a plaintiff who the jury
determines to be a victim of sex discrimination.245
Likewise, in Robertson v. Bryn Mawr Hospital,24 the jury concluded
that the defendant was liable for sexual harassment.2 47 In addressing the
reasoning behind the jury's award, the court noted that the jury may have
concluded that the plaintiff-a physician---"would be unlikely to suffer ill
effects from exposure to a few nude photographs of the centerfold variety"
and sustained no compensatory damages as aresult. t Nonetheless, this did
not prevent the jury from awarding other available remedies to the plaintiff,
including punitive damages.249
12 Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).
2431 d. at 1010.
2 Id. Title VII allows back pay awards when an employee does not leave his
or her employment voluntarily. If a plaintiff voluntarily quits, he or she must
establish that it was not voluntary but was a constructive discharge as a result of the
discrimination. Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1999).
If a plaintiff establishes constructive discharge, he or she is entitled to back pay if
the subsequent job pays less than the former job. Therefore, if Timm had
established that the harassment resulted in a constructive discharge and, as a result,
Timm was forced to accept a subsequent job in which she earned less than she
earned at Progressive Steel, she would have been entitled to back pay.
245 Timm, 137 F.3d at 1010.
246 Robertson v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., Civ. A. No. 94-2489, 1995 WL 375837
(E.D. Pa. June 20, 1995).




TITLE VII PuNiTVE DAMAGE AWARDS
Victims ofdiscrimination under Title VII are required to mitigate their
damages by searching for suitable employment. s To require an award of
compensatory, nominal or other Title VII damages to accompany a punitive
award under § 1981a would potentially punish a Title VII victim who
properly, or even eagerly, mitigates his or her damages. For example,
assume that instead of accepting a job offer that paid a greater salary,
Charmaine Timm remained under her harassers employ. Also assume that
shortly thereafter the harassment escalated to the point of intolerable
working conditions and, as a result, Timm was forced to leave herjob and
accept a different job that did not pay as well. In light of the harassment,
intolerable working conditions, and the salary decrease, Timm would be
entitled to back pay under Title VII.25 Assuming, however, that despite
remaining under her harassers employ, the jury concluded that she did not
suffer any compensatory damages under § 198 la. Under the First Circuit's
reasoning in Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Division ofMelville Corp.,
252
because the jury did not award compensatory damages, the back pay award
would be necessary to allow the jury to award Timm punitive damages
under § 198 Ia. Therefore, in the latter example, the plaintiffwould not be
entitled to punitive damages.
Such reasoning, which as shown could operate to reward a plaintiff for
maximizing damages as opposed to mitigating them, contradicts the
250 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994). An employee discharged, including one
who is constructively discharged, in violation of Title VII has an obligation to
attempt to mitigate his or her damages by using "reasonable diligence in finding
other suitable employment." Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982). The defendant has the burden of
demonstrating that the plaintiff has failed to attempt to mitigate. Clarke v. Frank,
960 F.2d 1146, 1152 (2d Cir. 1992). The defendant can do so by establishing "(1)
that suitable work existed, and (2) that the employee did not make reasonable
efforts to obtain it." Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163 F.3d 684,695 (2d Cir.
1998).
2s' In such a situation, because the plaintiff remained under the defendant's
employment when offered a higher paying job, it is unlikely that she would be able
to establish that she, at thattime, was constructively discharged. Therefore, because
no adverse employment action, such as discharge, had yet occurred, plaintiff was
not yet required to mitigate her damages and defendant would not be able to
demonstrate that she failed to mitigate when she declined the higher paying
position. See Ford, 458 U.S. at 231; Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139,
155-56 (3dCir. 1999);Haw/ins, 163 F.3dat 695-96; Virgo v. RiviemBeachAss'n,
Ltd., 30 F.3d 1350, 1363-64 (11th Cir. 1994).




fundamental mitigation requirement of Title VII.2 Instead, by allowing
juries to consider all available remedies under Title VII, courts would
ensure that all discrimination victims have an equal chance at obtaining
punitive damages.
D. Relying on Jury Apportionments Would Cause Inconsistent and
Impractical Results
Relying on a jury apportionment as the basis for a determination
whether punitive damages are available to a victim of Title VII
discrimination leads to inconsistent and impractical results. For example,
plaintiffs such as those in Kerr-Selgas v. American Airlines, Inc.5.' and
Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 5 may bring discrimination claims
pursuant to both state law and Title VII. 6 Thereafter, state law permitting,
the jury may apportion all compensatory damages to the state law and none
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.257 Simultaneous to not awarding any compensatory
damages under § 1981a, the jury may, however, decide to award punitive
damages under § 198 la.15 8 Under the view expressed by the First Circuit
in Kerr-Selgas, the plaintiff would not be entitled to punitive damages
because the jury did not award compensatory damages based on the
plaintiff's Title VII claims." In contrast, if the jury decides to apportion
all or part of the compensatory damages under § 1981a rather than under
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994); Ford, 458 U.S. at 231.
Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69 F.3d 1205 (1st Cir. 1995).
Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
16 InKerr-Selgas, the plaintiff, who filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Puerto Rico, "alleged sex discrimination, sexual harassment, and
retaliation under commonwealth and federal law, as well as pendant
commonwealth claims for wrongful termination and violation of her right to
privacy." Kerr-Selgas, 69 F.3d at 1207. In Cush-Crawford, the plaintiff asserted
causes of action under both Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law.
Cush-Crawford, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 296-97.
257 In Kerr-Selgas, the court concluded that all compensatory damages that the
jury awarded under special verdict"represented compensation for injuries sustained
in connection with... commonwealth claims," rather than federal claims. Kerr-
Selgas, 69 F.3d at 1214.
25 This occurred in Kerr-Selgas, where the district court entered judgment
against the defendants for $2,000,000 in compensatory damages under Puerto Rico
law, $350,000 in punitive damages on the federal claims, and $20,000 in severance
pay on the wrongful discharge claim. Id. at 1209.
259Id. at 1215.
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state law, the plaintiff would be entitled to punitive damages under §
198 la.20 Likewise, if state law does not allow compensatory damages and
the jury is forced to apportion any and all compensatory damages under §
1981a, the plaintiff would be entitled to punitive damages.6  These
inconsistent outcomes do not result from differences in injury among
plaintiffs. Rather, the different outcomes result from relying on jury
apportionments under various statutory schemes to determine if and when
a jury is free to consider awarding all available remedies to a victim of
Title VII discrimination. The rule as expressed by Timm and Cush-
Crawford, which does not require that a nominal award or any type of
compensatory award accompany a punitive damage award under § 198 la,
would act to ensure that a jury's allocation of damages will not, alone,
preclude a Title VII plaintiff from receiving punitive damages.
There is overwhelming support indicating that jurors do not
comprehend all that is expected of them.262 For example, studies agree that
jurors do not understand their instructions at an acceptable level,263 that
they confuse the standard of proof in civil cases,26 and that they fail to
recall the judge's instruction that they are not bound to accept expert
opinions. 26s From these studies, one may infer that a jury may not
understand the instructions or may confuse its choices regarding damages
allocation under state and federal statutes or, perhaps, that the jury may not
20°Id. at 1214.
11 TheNew York State Human Rights Law is one such state anti-discrimination
statute that does not provide for compensatory and punitive damages. Thoreson v.
Penthouselnt'l, Ltd., 606N.E.2d 1369,1370 (N.Y. 1992) (interpretingN.Y. ExEC.
LAW § 297(9) (McKinney 2001)).
262 See, e.g., Anna E. Saxman & Kerry B. DeWolfe, It's Unanimous: Jurors
Don't Understand Instructions! A Proposal for Eliminating Juror
Misunderstanding, VT. BJ. & L. DIG. 55, Dec. 1998, at 55; Walter W. Steele, Jr.
& Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REv. 77 (1988).
13 See, e.g., Saxman & DeWolfe, supra note 262, at 55.
264 See, e.g., Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury
Instructions?A Field Test UsingReal Juries andReal Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND
&WATERL. REv. 59, 99-100 (1998).
265 See, e.g., id. at 10 1-02. Other research shows that jurors often attempt to
make the law work fairly in a particular case. In a civil case, for example, the jury
may lessen a damage award to reflect the uncertainty it may feel about liability
even though the plaintiff has proven liability by a preponderance of the evidence.
Similarly, the jury may increase a damage award to reflect the sympathy it feels




understand the instruction that a particular state statute does not allow for
punitive damages. Finally, even if a rule is adopted allowing punitive
damages only if compensatory or nominal damages are awarded, these
studies suggest that it is not certain that the jury will comprehend and apply
such an instruction. Such research suggests that it would be foolish to allow
a jury's allocation of damages to determine whether a Title VII plaintiff is
entitled to punitive damages. In sum, a rule that allows punitive damages
without an accompanying compensatory or nominal award will reduce the
likelihood of inconsistent Title VII awards based on jury misunderstanding
or confusion. Instead, once a jury concludes that the defendant has
discriminated in violation of Title VII, the jury should be able to consider
whether punitive damages are appropriate.
In addition to mitigating jury confusion, a rule that does not require any
nominal or compensatory damage award to accompany a punitive damage
award would prevent courts from finding it necessary to read jurors' minds.
For example, in Robertson v. Bryn Mawr Hospital,2" the jury concluded
that the defendant was liable for sexual harassment to the plaintiff but did
not award the plaintiff any compensatory damages.2 67 The jury did,
however, award the plaintiff $10,000 in punitive damages.26 In upholding
the jury award, the court concluded that the jury's "relatively modest
punitive damage award might well have been characterized as
compensatory damages for the harassment which plaintiff did sustain."269
Likewise, when affirming the punitive damage award in Timm v.
Progressive Steel Treating, Inc. ,27° the Seventh Circuit evaluated the jury's
thinking by stating that "[plerhaps the jurors preferred to award a single
sum under the punitive category rather than apportion between
compensatory and punitive damages." 27'
The statements above confirm that problems and confusion exist
regarding juries' allocations ofdamages under Title VII. Additional studies
suggest that judges in civil trials usually incorrectly believe that jurors
understand the important facts, evidence, and the applicable law.21 While
many judges indicate that in a bench trial they would likely have found for
266 Robertson v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., Civ. A. No. 94-2489, 1995 WL 375837
(E.D. Pa. June 20, 1995).267Id. at*1.
268 Id.
269 Id. at *2 (emphasis added).
270 Timm v. Progressive Steil Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).
271 Id. at 1011 (emphasis added).
22 See, e.g., Saxton, supra note 264, at 107.
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the party whom the jury found against,2u thesejudges also believed that the
juries had understood key evidence and the law they were instructed to
apply.274 Such research demonstrates that judges, such as those presiding
over Robertson and Timm, are in no position to evaluate or speculate on
jury decisions. Allowing punitive damage awards under § 1981a without
a requisite nominal or compensatory award would alleviate the need for
courts to engage in the futile exercise of reading jurors' minds in order to
explain Title VII damage awards andallocations. No longerwilljudges feel
the need to guess the type or purpose ofjury awards under § 198 la. Rather,
judges will merely need to conclude that the jury found a violation of Title
VII before it considered awarding punitive damages under § 198 la.
VI. PROTECTIONS FOR DEFENDANTS SUBJECT TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARDS UNDER THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
Allowing a jury to award punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a
without awarding a compensatory or nominal damage award under that
section would not subject defendants to rampant liability for acts of
employment discrimination. Unlike 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. §
1983, which allow punitive damages without a compensatory damage
award,2 75 there is a cap on compensatory and punitive damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1981a.276 The cap, which was seen as necessary to protect
employers from financial ruin and frivolous law suits,2 should prevent
employers from fearing a rule that allows punitive damage awards without
an accompanying compensatory or nominal damage award. Specifically,
such a rule would not increase the maximum liability employers may face
under § 198 1a. Rather, recent U.S. Supreme Court guidelines along with
the statutory cap ensure that the proposed rule is reasonable and would not
debilitate employers.
A. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: MinimalProtectionsfor § 1981
and § 1983 Defendants
Because neither § 1981 nor § 1983 provides a cap on punitive damages,
courts lack an upper limit or definite guideline to help them identify
273 See, e.g., id. at 104-05.
274 See, e.g., id. at 107.
275 See supra Part LU.
276 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (1994).
277 Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 1997).
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excessive awards in these cases. In BMWofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore,27
however, the Supreme Court articulated guideposts to assist in determining
whether a punitive damage award is so excessive that it must be vacated or
reduced because it shocks the judicial conscience and violates due
process.279 The Court articulated three guideposts: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the tortuous conduct; (2) the ratio of punitive damages
to compensatory damages; and (3) the difference between this remedy and
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases? 0° While the
Court examined the excessiveness of punitive damages in state court, these
same factors apply to a review of punitive damage awards in federal
court. 81 In doing so, courts have attempted to impose some consistency
among § 1981 and § 1983 punitive damage awards.
In evaluating the first Gore guidepost, courts have emphasized that
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct is the most important factor in
assessing a punitive damage award. 2 Courts have routinely evaluated
"whether a defendant's conduct was violent or presented a threat of
violence, ... whether a defendant acted with deceit or malice as opposed
to... mere negligence, and... whether a defendant has engaged in
repeated instances of misconduct. ''283
The second Gore factor requires courts to evaluate the ratio between
the compensatory and punitive award. 4 While the Supreme Court noted
278 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
279 Id. at 574-85.
"° Id. In BMWofNorth America, Inc. v. Gore, defendant BMW decided not to
advise its dealers of pre-delivery damage to new cars in cases where the cost of
repair was less than three percent of the car's suggested retail price. Id. at 562. The
jury returned a verdict of $4000 in compensatory damages and $4,000,000 in
punitive damages under Alabama state law. Id. at 565. The Alabama Supreme
Court reduced the punitive damage award to $2,000,000. Id. at 567. On appeal, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a $2,000,000 punitive damage award was grossly
excessive in light of the low level of reprehensibility of defendant's conduct and
the 500 to 1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages. Id. at 575-83. In
addition, Justice Breyer noted that when analyzing a punitive damage award for
excessiveness, it is vital to consider the goal of deterrence, which involves
evaluating the defendant's size and wealth. Id. at 591 (Breyer, J., concurring).
281 See Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 809 n.2 (2d Cir. 1996).
22 Id. at 809 ("[T]he Supreme Court in Gore noted that reprehensibility is
'perhaps the most important' factor in assessing a punitive damage award."); see
also Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 816 (2d Cir. 1997); Groom v. Safeway, Inc.,
973 F. Supp. 987,994 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Florez v. Delbovo, 939 F. Supp. 1341,
1347 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
213 Lee, 101 F.3d at 809.
2 Gore, 517 U.S. at 580.
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the longstanding principle that exemplary damages must bear a reasonable
relationship to compensatory damages a 5 this factor has not been
problematic for subsequent courts even when juries have awarded punitive
damages without compensatory damages. Rather, courts frequently refer
to the language in Gore stating that the reasonableness of such a
relationship is no "simple mathematical" formula.286 For example, in Lee
v. Edwards, 7 where a punitive damage award followed a nominal damage
award in a § 1983 case, the court stated that "any appreciable exemplary
award would produce a ratio that would appear excessive by this
measure."288 As a result, the court dismissed this factor and looked to
punitive damage awards in other civil rights cases as a guide.2 9 Moreover,
in Cooper v. Casey, where the § 1983 compensatory damages were
minimal, the court emphasized that the smaller the compensatory damages,
the higher the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages must be in order
for punitive damages to achieve the deterrence objective.291 In sum, the
Supreme Court's instruction to evaluate the ratio between the
compensatory and punitive award has not affected the general rule that
allows punitive damages without compensatory damages under § 1981 and
§ 1983; nor has this factor impeded courts' abilities to evaluate the
excessiveness of punitive damage awards under these statutes.292
2
5 Id.
216 Id. at 582. The Supreme Court further stated in Gore that:
Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a
higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. A
higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to
detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been
difficult to determine.
Id.; seealso Cooperv. Casey, 97 F.3d914, 919 (7th Cir. 1996); Groomv. Safeway,
Inc., 973 F. Supp. 987, 994-95 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Florez v. Delbovo, 939 F.
Supp. 1341, 1348 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
217 Lee, 101 F.3d at 805.
2881d. at 811.
Id. The court also noted the Supreme Court's observations in Gore when it
stated that "violations of civil rights may very well be 'particularly egregious' acts
that result in only 'a small amount of economic damages' or injuries whose
monetary value is 'difficult to determine."' Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582).
290 Cooper, 97 F.3d at 914.
291 Id. at 919-20.
291 This is so despite the Supreme Court's statement that the ratio of the punitive
damage award to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff is perhaps the "most
commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages
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The third Gore factor requires courts to compare the punitive damage
award to civil and criminal penalties authorized or imposed in similar
cases.2 93 While courts continually look to punitive damage awards in other
§ 1981 and § 1983 cases both within and outside of the controlling
jurisdiction, m courts also look to punitive damages awarded in Title VII
cases for guidance. For example, in Florez v. Delbovo,295 the court sought
to determine whether a $750,000 punitive damage award under § 1981 was
excessive.2  In doing so, the court noted that while no federal civil fines or
criminal penalties applied to the conduct in question, "§ 1981a, the statute
that is perhaps most similar . . .caps all civil damage awards at
$300,000."' 7 Thereafter, the court indicated that such cap demonstrates
Congress's judgment as to the appropriate level of punitive damages, and
then reduced the punitive damage award to $275,000.298 Likewise, in Fall
v. Indiana University Board of Trustees,299 the court sought to determine
whether a § 1983 punitive damage award of $800,000 was excessive, where
the defendant allegedly grabbed and forcibly kissed the plaintiff while
reaching inside her blouse to fondle her breasts.300 In looking to penalties
inflicted upon defendants for comparable conduct, the court referred to
several Title VII sexual harassment decisions. 301 More specifically, the
court noted several Title VII decisions where defendants engaged in similar
conduct, but the punitive damage awards were significantly lower °.3 Such
decisions aided the court to determine that $50,000 was a more appropriate
punitive damage award.30 3
While the factors in Gore have provided guidance to courts seeking to
evaluate punitive damage awards under § 1981 and § 1983, neither statute
has a damage cap to act as a guide or limit to such damages. As a result,
award." Gore, 517 U.S. at 580.293 Id. at 583-85.
294 See Mathie v. Fries, 121 F.3d 808, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1997); Lee v. Edwards,
101 F.3d 805,811-12 (2d Cir. 1996); Fall v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 33 F. Supp. 2d
729,746 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Florez v. Delbovo, 939 F. Supp. 1341, 1349 (N.D. I.
1996).
295 Florez, 939 F. Supp. at 1341.
296 Id. at 1347-49.297 Id. at 1348.
298 Id. at 1348-49.
299 Fall, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 729.
300Id. at 733.
301 Id. at 746.
3
02Id.
303 Id. at 748.
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while both statutes allow for a punitive damage award without a
compensatory damage award, there exist only minimal protections for
defendants penalized with punitive damages. More specifically, while some
courts look to the § 1981a caps for guidance, it remains possible that a §
1981 or § 1983 jury could conclude that the plaintiff did not suffer any
compensable injury, but can award a punitive damage award over
$300,000-the maximum amount of punitive damages available under §
198 1a.3° In fact, as discussed above, the Cooper court noted that such ratio
may even be necessary to achieve the deterrent effect of punitive
damages. 305 Despite some guidance available to protect defendants from
excessive awards, juries remain able to award punitive damages to § 1981
and § 1983 victims without awarding compensatory damages.306
B. The Statutory Cap and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore:
Additional Protections for Title VIJ Defendants
Unlike defendants facing punitive damages under § 1981 or § 1983,
employers facing punitive damages under Title VII are protected by a
statutory cap that limits compensatory and punitive damages according to
the size of the employer.307 As a result, allowing a jury to award punitive
3)4 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(b)(3)(D) (1994).
31 Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 919-20 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Deters v.
Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying
the second Gore factor to conclude that where the injury is primarily personal, a
greater ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages may be appropriate);
cf McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1328 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the
"failure of the jury to assess compensatory damages... suggests that the goals of
punishment and deterrence will be adequately served by a reduced award").
306 See 137 CONG. REC. S15,020 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini). SenatorDeConcini noted that aWashington, D.C. law firm's empirical
study showed that unlimited damages provisions under § 1981 had not led to
"unlimited awards and bonanzas for lawyers." Id. For example, in actions brought
under § 1981, "plaintiffs were awarded compensatory and punitive damages in
only 68 of 576 reported cases between 1980 and 1989. Plaintiffs received less that
$50,000-for both compensatory and punitive damages combined-in two-thirds
of these 68 cases, and received more than $200,000 in only three instances." 136
CONG. REC. E2478 (daily ed. July 25, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hawkins). If
outrageous punitive awards have not been prevalent under § 1981, where no cap
exists, there is no reason to believe that allowing Title VII plaintiffs to receive
punitive damages without compensatory or nominal damages will result in
outrageous punitive damages where such cap does exist.
307 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(b)(3) (1994).
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damages without an accompanying compensatory award would not subject
Title VII defendants to larger maximum awards than they would face if a
compensatory award were required to accompany a punitive award. While
§ 1981 and § 1983 defendants must hope that courts consider the caps, Title
VII defendants can rely on such protection. This additional protection
further ensures that Title VII defendants are not debilitated by a rule that
allows punitive damages without an accompanying compensatory or
nominal award.
Under § 1981a, the jury initially sets the punitive damage award
without being told about the statutory cap."' Specifically, the jury
determines an amount in light of what it sees fit to punish the employer for
its conduct, and to deter the defendant and others from engaging in similar
activity.3°9 Thereafter, if the compensatory and punitive award, together,
surpass the relevant cap, the district court reduces the award to ensure that
it conforms to the cap set for an employer of the defendant's size 10 Since
the passage of § 198 1a, courts have routinely reduced awards to the limit
imposed by the relevant cap. In fact, courts have also reduced excessive
punitive damage awards to below the relevant statutory cap. When doing
so, courts demonstrate that the § 1981a(b)(3) caps serve as a supplement
to the Gore factors rather than a mandatory award and, as such, the caps
serve as additional protection to the Title VII defendant.
1. Reduction of§ 1981a Awards Below the Relevant Caps When
Juries Award Compensatory and Punitive Damages Under § 1981a
In Gray v. Tyson Foods Inc.,311 the jury awarded the plaintiffs 185,000
in compensatory damages and $800,000 in punitive damages under §
198 la.12 In evaluating the defendant's motion forremittitur, the court first
reduced the compensatory award to $50,000.3'3 The court then noted that
$250,000 was the maximum punitive award allowed and sought to
determine if that amount was excessive? 4 After applying the Gore factors,
the court concluded that the defendant's behavior was not "the most
3
1
8 Id. § 198la(c)(2); see Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210,221 (2d Cir.
1997).
3 9 Luciano, 110 F.3d at 221.
310 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(3) (1994); see Luciano, 110 F.3d at 221; Hogan v.
Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 61 F.3d 1034, 1037 (1st Cir. 1995).
311 Gray v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 948 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
312 Id. at 960.
3,3 Id. at 957.
314 Id. at 958-59.
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egregious behavior imaginable and therefore, the maximum punishment
was not reasonable.1 5 Rather, the court found that the evidence supported
apunitive damage award of$100,000. 36 Similarly, inLawyerv. 84Lumber
Co., 317 the jury awarded theplaintiff$75,000 in compensatory damages and
$250,000 in punitive damages?" The defendant challenged the jury award
as excessive and beyond the statutory cap. When addressing the Gore
factors, the court emphasized that the case was not "the most reprehensible
case that would justify punitive damages near the $300,000 statutory
maximum."" Thereafter, the court reduced the punitive award to
$150,000, an amount well below the statutory maximum.
320
2. Reduction of§ 1981a Awards Below the Relevant Caps When
Juries Award Punitive Damages without Compensatory Damages
Hennessy v. PenriI Datacomm Networks, InC.321 is the most poignant
case to demonstrate that adequate protections exist to ensure that allowing
a jury to award punitive damages under § 1981a without awarding
compensatory damages would not subject defendants to limitless liability.
As discussed in Part IV, in Hennessy, the jury did not award the plaintiff
compensatory damages based on her Title VII claim, but awarded her
$350,000 in punitive damages under § 198 la.3v Thereafter, the trial judge
reduced the punitive damage award to $100,000.11 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that the jury was permitted to award punitive damages
without an accompanying compensatory award under § 198 1a,324 and then
addressed the amount of punitive damages awarded. 3"5 In doing so, the
315 Id. at 959.
316 Id.
317 Lawyer v. 84 Lumber Co., 991 F. Supp. 973 (N.). Ill. 1997).
318 Id. at 975.
319 Id. at 977. The court relied on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning that the
statutory cap should be taken into consideration as the amount to be awarded in the
most reprehensible case. SeeHennessyv. Penril DatacommNetworks, Inc., 69 F.3d
1344, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995).
320 Lawyer, 991 F. Supp. at 977.
321 tHennessy, 69 F.3d at 1344.
3
1 Id. at 1349; see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
3
2 Hennessy, 69 F.3d at 1349. Pursuant to § 198 la(b)(3), the court reduced the
punitive award to the statutory cap applicable to an employer of the defendant's
size. Id. at 1354.
324 Id. at 1356.
32I Id. at 1354-56.
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court noted that the trial judge followed the statutory damage scheme of §
1981a and reduced the jury award to the cap applicable to the size of the
defendant employer.326 Subsequently, however, the court reasoned that the
maximum permissible award should be reserved for egregious cases. While
the jury was able to award punitive damages, the court reviewed other sex
discrimination cases and concluded that the facts of Hennessy were not so
egregious as to allow the entire award to consist of the maximum punitive
amount permitted under law.3 27 As a result, the court remanded the case to
the trial court to determine a more appropriate punitive damage award.3
The cases above demonstrate that the Gore guideposts and the statutory
cap operate together to protect Title VII defendants from facing limitless
punitive liability. Whereas § 1981 and § 1983 defendants may be subject
to large punitive damage awards without accompanying compensatory
awards and are protected by the Gore guideposts only, employers subject
to similar liability under Title VII enjoy maximum protections. Indeed,
Hennessy demonstrates that courts will scrutinize a punitive damage award
that did not accompany a compensatory damage award. Moreover,
Hennessy as well as Gray v. Tyson Foods Inc. 329 and Lawyer v. 84 Lumber
Co. 330 show that courts are willing to protect employers by reducing a
punitive damage award to below the relevant statutory cap when the
employer's actions are not egregious enough to wan-ant the most excessive
monetary punishment under § 198 la.331
326 Id. at 1354.
327 Id. at 1355-56. The court noted that:
When Congress permitted, for the first time, awards of compensatory
and punitive damage awards in Title VII cases, it was concerned with
keeping those damages under reasonable control. It did not want Title VII
awards, especially of punitive damages, to be excessive as they can be in
other areas of the law.
Id. at 1355. In evaluating other sex discrimination cases, the court pointed to
Nichols v. Frank as an example of a "more egregious" sex discrimination case. Id.
at 1356 (citing Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503 (9th Cir. 1994)).
328 Id. at 1356.
329 Gray v. Tyson Foods Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 948 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
330 Lawyer v. 84 Lumber Co., 991 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
331 Several circuit courts have concluded that only when an award would "shock
the judicial conscious... and constitute a denial ofjustice" by resulting in financial
ruin, or near financial ruin, of the defendant, would the court reduce the award
below the statutory cap. Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 202 F.3d 1262, 1273
(10th Cir. 2000); see Baty v. Willamette Indus., 172 F.3d 1232, 1245 (10th Cir.
1999); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 1997); Lee v. Edwards,
101 F.3d 805, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1996). These courts are more reluctant to reduce a
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VII. CONCLUSION
The history of punitive damages demonstrates that they are intended to
punish and deter wrongdoing. In 1991, Congress extended the availability
of punitive damages to victims of employment discrimination under Title
VII bypassing 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a. In doing so, Congress further unified the
remedies and protections of the federal civil rights statutes while including
caps to protect employers from financial ruin and frivolous litigation.
Nonetheless, while victims of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are entitled to punitive damages without suffering a
compensable injury, some courts have concluded that a jury is not
permitted to award punitive damages under § 1981a without awarding
compensatory or nominal damages under that statute. Severalreasons aside
from Congress's effort to further unify the federal civil rights statutes
suggest that courts should adopt and expand on the rule applied to § 1981
and § 1983 damage jurisprudence.
Nothing in the plain language of § 1981a requires a compensatory or
nominal award to accompany a punitive award; nor does anything within
the statute indicate that one subject to an employer's malicious behavior is
not entitled to all available remedies. Indeed, allowing juries to award
punitive damages to all victims of Title VII discrimination would alleviate
inconsistent and impractical awards along with the need for courts to read
jurors' minds. In contrast, encouraging courts to rely on state tort laws to
determine whether a compensatory or nominal damage award must
predicate a punitive damage award would worsen the already inconsistent
§ 1981a damage jurisprudence. Finally, the relevant caps under § 1981a,
along with the three factors articulated in BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v.
Gore, provide more than adequate protection for employers facing punitive
damages under § 198 la. In sum, by allowing juries to award punitive
damages under § 1981a without awarding a compensatory or nominal
award, courts can go one step further in ensuring that all discrimination
victims are entitled to the same remedies and that all discriminatory actors
are punished and deterred from illegal behavior.
§ 1981a award below the cap. Nonetheless, the cap still operates as an additional
protection for defendants subject to a punitive damage award without an
accompanying compensatory award-a protection that § 1981 and § 1983 defen-
dants do not enjoy.
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